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The thesis uses market data to investigate irrational investors in the financial markets. Traditional 
finance theory states that irrational investors do not influence asset prices. The analysis confirms this 
statement. The thesis also looks into the survival of irrational investors. The analysis shows that 
irrational investors will not survive. 
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1. Introduction 
The emergence of technology can be traced back to the spear and arrow.  Hunter-gatherers 
developed these basic tools to enhance the physical labor needed in procuring food. The 
creation of the machine, such as the tractor, introduced the next stage in the evolution of 
technology.  These complex tools allowed for the substitution of physical labor and 
permitted humans to exceed physical limitations. This resulted in a tremendous increase in 
production.  Technology, in essence, has always been developed to increase efficiency and 
productivity.   
At this day in age, most things in society are being mediated by automated machines.  Unlike 
their predecessors, these multifaceted machines do not need an operator to control its 
functions. Instead, automatic algorithms replace human control.  One such machine that is 
used in our daily lives in more ways than one is the computer.  
The advances in robotics enable computers to take over human tasks and increase efficiency 
and productivity by eliminating human weakness. However, human nature in general 
renders imperfections.  There will always be differences in levels of quality and cost. More 
often than not, humans are considered expensive and lacking in speed and accuracy.  To 
cope with a complex and dynamic world, humans adopt certain survival techniques and 
short cuts called heuristics to overcome the enormous amounts of information they are 
bombarded with every day. Our limitations make our decision making flawed.  
The financial markets today focus primarily on speed. Investment companies move closer to 
the physical location of the market place, preferably in the same house, to reduce the time it 
takes to send and receive information. The majority of the “traffic” is not carried out by 
human investors, but advanced computer programs that follow a preprogrammed set of 
rules. As more of the market movements are performed by computer programs, reducing 
the influence of educated investors, one can assume that the dynamics of the markets will 
inevitably change.   
Norwegian media has focused heavily on the issue of fairness in the market place. Do the 
computers follow the same rules and regulations as normal investors? Human beings do not 
possess the same mental processing capacity that computers do. Put simply, computers are 
faster. They can handle larger amounts of information and have a better problem solving 
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capability.   This means that computers can act on information before the traditional 
investors see the opportunity. Does this mean that computers take advantage of human 
weakness? This man vs. the machine dilemma is an emerging problem in the Norwegian 
financial markets. It was not until April 2010 that the OSE1 decided to upgrade their 
computer trading system by increasing its speed and consequently claiming the benefits of 
HFT2.  The OSE has so far put little regulation on the use of algorithm trading, and it may be 
too early to clearly predict the effects of this change in the market. 
The growth of the internet combined with the use of an electronic trading platform opened 
up the possibility of online trading of financial products in the financial markets.  Well into 
the 1990’s an investor had to contact an investment bank to execute transactions. Now 
anyone can trade shares from their living room through online investment banks.  
Traditional finance theory assumes rational investors (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2009). These 
theories do not account for investors displaying human weakness. One may argue that an 
educated financial advisor is as rational as an investor can be. They possess expert 
knowledge of the financial markets and the market mechanisms. In 1985 De Bondt and 
Thaler published an article called “Does the stock market overreact?” The article looked 
closely at the reaction pattern of investors to dramatic news and events. Their interest in the 
combination of “market behavior and the psychology of individual decision making” (De 
Bondt & Thaler, 1985) was the beginning of modern behavioral finance.  With the possibility 
of online investment banks another group of investors can directly influence the market. 
These investors may not have deep knowledge about the financial markets. Investors that 
act on hunches instead of fundamental values are not accounted for in traditional finance 
theory. Behavioral finance tries to use the knowledge of psychology to see how psychology 
influences the investors’ behavior and subsequently the financial markets (Sewell, 2010). 
With an educational background from both psychology and finance it was tempting to fuse 
these academic disciplines to test some of the hypotheses originating from behavioral 
finance theory. There has been an increased awareness about algorithm and HFT since 
strange occurrences has happened in the financial markets. The focus of thesis is not on the 
potential good or bad consequences stemming from algorithm and HFT; it only looks upon 
                                                          
1 Oslo Stock Exchange will now be referred to as OSE  
2 High Frequency Trading will now be referred to as HFT 
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them as ultra-rational investors with a large investment capacity. Rather, it is their influence 
on the market place dynamics, which is of an interest. This means that the introduction of 
HFT works as a major increase in the amount of rational investors present in the market.  
This thesis attempts to enlighten the role of the irrational agent through quantitative 
exploration of real world data. This is not done without difficulties. How does one 
differentiate between rational and irrational investors in publicly available aggregate data? 
In such volatile times, is it possible to single out the true effects of HFT? 
 There are two hypotheses that are put to the test: 
1. Can irrational investors survive in the financial markets? 
2. Do irrational investors have an impact on asset prices? 
The first hypothesis looks closer at the survival of the irrational investor. Financial theory 
states that these investors will “buy high, and sell low” (De Long, Shleifer, Summer & 
Waldmann, 1991) and in the end run out of the financial strength needed to stay in the 
markets. HFT increases the number of rational investors that can exploit the mispricing of 
the irrational investors. The effect should be reflected in the number of transactions 
performed by the different groups of investors.  
The second hypothesis looks closely at the influence of the irrational investors on the 
financial markets. Financial theory states that irrational investors do not have an impact on 
asset prices (Friedman, 1953), (Fama, 1965). Our society charges taxes and fees that 
increases the risk associated with exploiting the mispricing caused by irrational investors, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of their influence. We also live in a society where financial 
news can be accessed by anyone. This could lead to irrational investors’ unconsciously 
becoming more rational. Assuming that irrational investors have an influence on asset 
prices, and that this influence is reduced by the introduction of HFT, it should be revealed in 
the volatility of OSE. 
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2. Theory 
The theory section of this thesis begins by explaining the arguments of the classical finance 
theorists. This will then be followed by a detailed presentation of relevant behavioral finance 
theories. These theories contain the elements that this thesis aims to test and are also the 
source of the null and alternative hypothesis. Lastly, a short introduction to HFT (HFT) will be 
given. 
2.1 Price formation/ Asset pricing 
There are several ways to approach asset pricing. To keep a relatively similar system between 
the theoretical models, a consumption based asset pricing model will be used in describing 
the price formation. The model is described in Cochrane (2005, ch.1).  
Cochrane (2005) presents a two period model with two types of investors; young and old. 
When the investors are young they have to decide between consumption now (period t), 
and consumption later (period t+1). This means that the investor will, in period t, invest the 
cash that is not used for consumption. The investor will invest in a stock (or asset with 
uncertain cash flow). This will yield the following base for consumption in period t+1 as the 
investors will use all assets for consumption: 
Eq(1)     1 1 1t t tx p d     
Where pt+1 represent the price of the stock at time t+1, and dt+1 is the dividend payout 
received. These quantities are unknown at time t, so xt+1 is a stochastic variable (Cochrane, 
2005).  
The motivation behind the investments is for the investors to maximize their expected utility 
over their life time. Over the two periods their utility function is given by: 
Eq(2)     > @1 1( , ) ( ) ( )t t t t tU C C u C E u CE   , 
E is the investors’ subjective discount factor that captures the investors’ impatience.  
Eq(3)    1
1
E G   
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G  is the time preference of money. It is assumed that people prefer money now rather than 
later. 
The utility function is maximized given the following budget constraints: 
Eq(4), Eq(5)    
1 1 1
t t t
t t t
C e p
C e x
[
[  
 
   
te , 1te  is exogenous income in t and t+1 (Cochrane, 2005).  
The utility function comes with a set of assumptions that creates a frame for our analysis. 
These assumptions can be seen in figure 1 below: 
                    
 
Figure 1: Assumptions for utility function 
When the utility function is optimized with regards to [   it yields the following first order 
conditions, known as the pricing equation: 
Eq(6)    1 1
(´ )
(´ )
t
t t t
t
u Cp E x
u C
E  ª º « »¬ ¼  
The pricing equation can be simplified to: 
Assumptions 
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individual 
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expected 
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time 
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separabel 
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Eq(7)    > @1 1t t t tp E m x   
Eq(8)    1(´ )
(´ )
t
t
t
u Cm
u C
E   
Where 1tm  is the stochastic discount factor for time t+1. 
This pricing formula can be generalized from a two period model by assuming the following: 
x power utility function (CRRA) 
x lognormal distributed consumption growth 
x joint distribution of asset returns and consumption growth is lognormal. 
This yields the following pricing equation (Cochrane, 2005): 
Eq(9)    1 1 1
[ ] ( , )
1
t t
t t t tf
t
E xp Cov m x
r

    
The asset price is dependent on three factors: a) the risk free interest rate, b) the rational 
investors’ expectation to next year’s return, and c) the stochastic discount factor.  
 
The key in this mathematical formula lies in the assumptions that are associated with the 
utility function. They postulate the existence of only rational investors. A rational investor is 
an individual who seeks to maximize his or hers expected utility through maximizing his or 
her consumption with regards to the risk associated with the investment opportunities 
(Cochrane, 2005).  
We can draw lines from the theory of price formation to the theory of random walk (asset 
price movements). If irrational investors do exist, their faulty views will be eliminated by the 
rational investors.  The rational investors fight with each other for the newest and best 
information available. New information will automatically be reflected in the stock price. The 
only powers that can move the stock price are unforeseen shocks and events. This means 
that the likelihood of a price going up or down is dependent on the probability distribution 
of the random events. In finance, it has been assumed that the economical shocks that 
influence the prices are normally distributed with a mean of zero (Fama, 1965) 
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Eq(10)    2(0, )
t t
u
p u
u N
P
V
 
 
An investor cannot, consistently, achieve returns that are in excess of the market return. 
Malkiel (2003) states that, “efficient financial markets do not allow investors to earn above-
average returns without accepting above-average risks.”  An investor (with a large portfolio) 
cannot achieve higher returns than the market without taking on additional risk. This theory 
is in accord with the Efficient Market Hypothesis which looks into the degree of information 
reflected in the stock price.  
2.2 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)  
According to Fama (1970) “the primary role of the capital markets is allocation of ownership 
of the economy’s capital stock”. Fama formed the efficient market hypothesis stating that “a 
market in which prices always fully reflect all available information is called efficient” (Fama, 
1970). The definition, however, of an efficient market is rather vague. It does not specify the 
exact definitions of the terms “available information” and “fully reflect”.  
 
Instead of a single definition, Fama used Samuelson’s (1965) taxonomy that identifies three 
forms of market efficiencies: weak-form, semi strong-form, and strong form: 
     
x The weak form hypothesis states that all information that can be derived from 
historical prices, trading volumes or short interest cannot be used to generate return 
excess of the market return. 
x Semi strong-form hypothesis states that all publicly available information is already 
reflected in the stock prices.  
x Strong- form hypothesis states that all information, public and private, are reflected 
in the stock prices.  
By creating a theory that allows for different states of informational availability, he created a 
more dynamic theory that covers a wider specter of the world.  
These efficiency theories assume that there are no costs associated with the collection of 
information. In the real world the price of information is connected to its importance, and 
speed of its delivery. This could create a situation with informational asymmetry, but this is 
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not accounted for in these theories. The simplification makes it easier to use the definitions 
of EMH in empirical testing. EMH is based on the following assumptions (Shleifer, 2000): 
x The investors are independent, rational, profit maximizing individuals 
x All information is free but is randomly available  
x There are no taxes or transaction costs in the market 
2.3 Behavioral finance 
As a reaction to the efficient market hypothesis and traditional financial theory, which 
assume that all investors are rational individuals that invest in a homogenous way, 
economists influenced by psychological theory began arguing that investors are not rational 
beings and therefore the financial markets are inefficient. Their arguments against rational 
investors were founded on the psychological research on heuristics.  Heuristics are cognitive 
methods employed to simplify the world. Heuristics are used to “reduce the complex task of 
assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, 
these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors” 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). These short cuts hinder investors from always behaving 
rational.  
Traditional financial theory that is based on the EMH and the assumption of rational investor 
cannot satisfyingly explain all of the actual market movements (De Bondt & Thaler, 1984). De 
Bondt and Thaler (1984) looked closer at the overreaction of stock markets. They found that 
prior “looser” stocks had a tendency to outperform prior “winner” stocks and therefore 
proving a degree of predictability in the market. Other market movements that cannot be 
explained are irrational bubbles, sudden market crashes, and the equity premium puzzle 
(EPP) among others.  The EPP stems from the equity premium (excess return of a risky asset 
over a riskless) found in the US stock markets. This premium is greater than what “can be 
rationalized in the context of the neoclassical paradigm of financial economics” (Mehra, 
2003).   Behavioral finance theorists argue that including human imperfections in the 
financial models will make the models better describe the observed phenomena.  
Because of its psychological roots behavioral finance theorists tend to focus on psychological 
shortcuts that remove our rational being. Most critics say that behavioral finance is a study 
of anomalies rather than a theory of the markets as a whole and that this is their 
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shortcoming. The following section will present two behavioral finance theories which will 
form the basis of this thesis’ two research questions.  
2.4 Limits of Arbitrage Model 
The limits of Arbitrage model looks into a situation where rational agents cannot eliminate 
all of the influence that irrational agents have on asset prices. The mispricing caused by the 
irrational agent creates added risk to the rational agent thereby reducing their willingness to 
exploit the mispricing (Matsen, 2011). In this model, the assumption of the rational 
homogenous agent is relaxed.  These agents would normally guarantee that the financial 
markets are efficient (market fully reflects all available information).  
Even if there is a situation where irrational agents are present in the market, one can still 
have efficient markets if: 
x the irrational agents act in a random manner 2(0, )I N V  so that their irrationality 
is cancelled out by other irrational agents, or 
x the irrational agents deviate in a systematic way, which leads to a mispricing of the 
asset that the rational investors can eliminate with opposite position. This eliminates 
the irrational agents influence on the asset price.  
(Matsen, 2011) 
If the markets are efficient it means that the irrational agents do not influence the asset 
price, and therefore do not influence the market volatility.  
Limits of arbitrage argue that these irrational (outside investors) agents can influence the 
market price of an asset through the unwillingness of rational (arbitrageurs) investors to 
take on the added risk created by the irrational agents. (Matsen, 2011).  
The limits of arbitrage model consist of rational and irrational agents. The rational agents 
trade on fundamental values whereas the irrational agents trade on noise. Black (1986) 
labels noise as information without any informational value (without real fundamental 
value). In financial markets a rational agent will face the fundamental risk that stems from 
the uncertainty about future fundamental values. However, they also face the possibility 
that the noise traders’ influence can get stronger making their positions worse off. This risk 
arises from the possibility that the already mispriced asset will become even more mispriced 
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at a later time; since most rational investors have short investment horizon they may not be 
able to wait for the mispricing to disappear. This added risk reduces the rational agents’ 
thirst of exploiting the irrational agents’ mispricing (Gromb & Vayanos, 2010).     
The mathematical model for cross asset arbitrage was introduced by Gromb and Vayanos 
(2010).  
2.4.1 Cross asset arbitrage (Gromb & Vayanos, 2010) 
The cross asset arbitrage model has two foundations on which it explains the dynamics of 
the financial market. Limits of arbitrage are normally considered as the first “building block 
needed to explain anomalies. The other building block is demand shocks experienced by 
investors other than arbitrageurs” (Gromb & Vayanos, 2010). The demand shocks move 
asset prices away from fundamental values. Limits of arbitrage prohibit the arbitrageurs to 
correct the mispricing.  
The model consists of two types of investors. The first type of investor is the traditional 
rational investor. They are competitive, risk averse and utility maximizing. Gromb and 
Vayanos referred to these investors as the arbitrageurs. The second type of investor is called 
the outside investor. These agents are the irrational investors in this model. Their 
irrationality is represented by an inelastic demand (u) for the risky asset A. u is the demand 
shock that moves asset prices away from fundamental values (Gromb & Vayanos, 2010). 
It is a two period model that has two risky assets (A and B). These assets have payoff dA and 
dB. , , , ,A B A Bd d V V U  represents the mean payoff for A and B, standard deviation for A and B 
and the correlation between the payoff of A and B. Since arbitrageurs are rational their 
payoff is equal to the mean payoff B Bd d . We assume that dA and dB are jointly normal 
distributed to simplify the calculations. 
The model describes a shock driven economy. The economy only consists of the arbitrageurs 
and outsiders so their total demand makes up the total demand of the economy. To simplify 
the model Gromb and Vayanos (2010) normalized the demand for asset A to zero. In a 
model such as this the actual demand in number of units is not interesting. It is the effect of 
a demand shock that is of an interest. By setting the net demand to zero the model will 
clearly display these effects, and be simpler mathematically.  In the instance of a demand 
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shock ( 0u z ) asset prices will move away from fundamental values and arbitrageurs will try 
to exploit the mispricing (Gromb & Vayanos, 2010).  
In period one, the arbitrageurs have to choose their investment in asset A (XA) and in asset B 
(XB) to maximize their expected utility: 
Eq(11)    > @1 exp( 2)E WD   
This function is subject to the budget constraint: 
Eq(12)    2 1 ( ) ( )A A A B B BW W x d p x d p      
WhereD = risk aversion of arbitrageurs. By inserting the budget constraint into the formula 
for expected utility, using the assumption of normality, and the assumption of B Bp d . 
Optimizing Xe will  be equivalent to maximizing the mean variance objective function, 
where one tries to minimize the outcome:  
Eq(13)     2 2 2 2( ) ( 2 )
2A A A A A B B A B A B
x d p x x x xD V V V V U     
 
This gives the following optimal investments in asset A and B (Gromb & Vayanos, 2010): 
Eq(14)     2 2(1 )
A A
A
A
d px DV U
   
Eq(15)    2
( )
(1 )
A A
B
A B
d px UDV V U
    
If we take into account that asset A is in zero net supply:  
Eq(16)    0Ax u  . 
We get the following equilibrium price for asset A: 
Eq(17)    2 2(1 )A A Ap d uDV U    
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As we can see from the equation, the price of asset A, pA, will increase when there is a 
demand from outside investors. This excess demand will drive the price above fundamental 
value. The price of asset A will be higher: 
x the higher the risk aversion of the arbitrageurs, D  
x the higher the volatility of asset A, 2AV  
x the lower the correlation between asset A and B (due to the poor hedging 
possibility), U   
x the higher the demand from outside investors, u  
There are two types of risk associated with asset A. First there is fundamental risk which 
stems from the uncertainty of the assets future value (dividend stream). The second source 
of uncertainty is called non fundamental risk. In the model Gromb and Vayanos (2010) a 
third period (period 0) where , ,A Bd d u  are stochastic is introduced. The asset price depends 
“on the realization of u” (Gromb & Vayanos, 2010), which is unknown and stochastic. From 
the pricing formula we can find the equation for the non fundamental risk in period 0 
created by the outside investors (Gromb & Vayanos, 2010). By taking the variance of the 
price of asset A, then taking the square root of the variance (Matsen, 2011): 
2 2
2 2 4 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
( ) ( (1 ) )
( ) (1 )
( ) (1 (1 ) )
A A A
A A A u
A A A u
VAR P VAR d u
VAR P
VAR P
DV U
V D V U V
V D V U V
  
  
  
 
Taking the square root of the final expression above leads to equation for non fundamental 
risk. 
Eq(18)     2 2 2 2 21 (1 )pA A A uV V D V U V    
The presence of outside investors will increase the volatility of asset A through
2 2 2 2 2(1 )A uD V U V . When there is high uncertainty in the market, either represented through 
the variance of asset A or the demand shock u, it leads to a larger mispricing of the asset.  
Alpha represents the level of risk aversion inherent in the arbitrageur. This coefficient 
reports how accepting an investor is to uncertainty. A high value of the coefficient means 
that the investor is not willing to take on a lot of risk. The investor will then be less willing to 
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exploit arbitrage opportunities, thereby letting the outside investors influence the asset 
price which leads to increased volatility in the price of the asset. This will lead to a situation 
where the outside investors can permanently influence the price and volatility of the asset. 
The non fundamental risk can be reduced through hedging opportunities if asset A or asset B 
is highly correlated.  
2.5 Noise Trader Model 
The second model that is introduced is called the noise trader model. The theory stated in 
this section is taken from the article “Noise trader risk in financial markets” (1990) by De 
Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann. 
As stated earlier the “unpredictability of noise traders’ beliefs creates a risk in the price of 
the asset that” (De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann, 1990) will deter the rational 
investors from seeking to exploit the mispricing. This means that according to noise trader 
theory irrational investors have a permanent impact on the price of an asset.  
The theory uses an overlapping generation model. There are two types of investors in 
model: the rational investors and the irrational investors (called noise traders). The economy 
lasts forever, but the individual agent will only live for two periods. The initial investment 
will occur in the first period, and the wealth will be consumed in the second period. There 
are two assets present, one risk free and one risky. The risk free asset pays an interest rate r, 
is in elastic supply and has a price of 1.  The risky asset pays a dividend of d, is in inelastic 
supply normalized to one unit, and has an unknown price pt. In this model d=r. The total 
demands for the risky asset is given by the demand from the rational investors RO  , and the 
demand from the irrational investors IO (De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann, 1990). 
Since the rational and the irrational investors make up the entire population of investors it is 
easier to work with normalized values. This means that the total amount of investors equal 1 
(100%). The rational investors will make up 1P of the population, and the irrational 
investors will make upP . 
The model assumes that the rational investors are risk averse with short investment 
horizons. The irrational investors have faulty expectations about future asset prices. This 
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mispricing ( tU ) is comprehensive for all noise trade and is normally distributed with a mean 
of *U and variance of 2UV  (De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann, 1990) 
* 2( , )t N UU U V . 
tU is the “expectational error in period t regarding the price in period t+1” (Matsen, 2011).  “
*U is a measure for the average “bullishness” of the noise traders” (De Long, Shleifer, 
Summers & Waldmann, 1990). 2UV  represents the variance of the “misperceptions of the 
expected return per unit of the risky asset” (De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann, 1990). 
The noise traders will therefore optimize their investments based on faulty expectations.  
Both investors utility is represented through a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) 
function: 
Eq(20)    (2 )wU e J  . 
W is the initial wealth of the investor and J is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (De 
Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann, 1990). The investors will maximize their expected 
utility  
Eq(21)    (2 )( ) wtE U E e
Jª º ¬ ¼  
“With normally distributed returns to holding a unit of the risky asset, maximizing the” (De 
Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann, 1990) utility is the same as maximizing the mean 
variance objective function: 
Eq(22)    > @1 1 1( ) var ( )t t t t tE U E w wJ     
2.5.1 Demand functions 
Wealth in time t+1 is the following for the investors: 
Eq(23/24)   1 1
1 1
( )(1 ) ( )
( )(1 ) ( )
R R R
t t t t t t
I I I
t t t t t t
w w p r p r
w w p r p r
O O
O O
 
 
    
      
Where tw is the initial wealth at time t, tp  is price of the risky asset at time t, and 1tp   is 
price of the risky asset at time t+1. 
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This will give the rational agent a demand for the risky asset equal (Matsen, 2011): 
Eq(25/26/27)   
> @ > @
> @
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t t t t t t t t
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The irrational agents demand for the risky asset (Matsen, 2011): 
Eq(28/29/30)   
> @ > @
> @ > @
> @
1 1
1 1
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The irrational agents’ demand is equal to the demand of the rational agents plus the 
inherent misperception of the expected return of the risky asset. In this model the investors 
can have a negative demand, which means they are allowed to take short positions in the 
assets (De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann, 1990).  When the irrational agents are 
“bullish” they will have a higher demand for the risky asset then the rational investors; 
therein driving the price of the risky asset above its fundamental values. The opposite is true 
when the irrational investors are “bearish”. 
2.5.2 Equilibrium price 
In equilibrium, the demand must equal the supply. Earlier the supply of the risky asset was 
normalized to one unit. This means that the total demand of the rational investors and the 
total demand of the irrational investor must sum to one: 
Eq(31)    (1 ) 1I Rt tPO P O    
This means that the price of the risky asset is given by: 
Eq(32)    > @1 11 2 ( ) *1 Rt t t t tp r E p Var pr J PU ª º   ¬ ¼  
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De long et al. focused on a world with steady state equilibriums in their paper. In 
mathematical terms one can rewrite the conditional expectation on the price in t+1 to the 
unconditional expectation of price in t, because they will be identical. Therefore the pricing 
equation in steady state will be: 
Eq(33)    
2 2
2
2( *) *1
1 (1 )
t
tp r r r r
UJP VP U U PU      
The price of the risky asset will be driven above or below fundamental values depending on 
the “bullishness” of the irrational investors. In this analysis it is assumed that the noise 
trader risk is systematic (Matsen, 2011). That means that noise traders are bullish and 
bearish as a group. When these investors are bullish they will drive the prices higher, yet 
they will continue to invest in the asset. If they are bearish they will drive the prices down 
below fundamental values and keep selling. This partly fits with Friedman’s (1953) opinion 
that noise traders cannot survive in the financial markets. He claimed that these investors 
buy when prices are high, and sell when the prices are low and will therefore lose all their 
wealth. In essence this means that all irrational agents that enter the financial markets will 
exit the markets when all their wealth is consumed. In the long run there would be no 
irrational agents left in the market.
 
2.6 HFT  
In the 80’s investment companies began using electronic trading platforms. Along with the 
enhancement of computer technology came steady improvements in the speed, capacity 
and accuracy of the trading platforms and its software.  Some of the benefits with HFT are 
that computers have a higher processing capacity than humans; they do not get sick, and 
have faster reaction (Aldridge, 2010).  Along with with reduced brokerage fees this savings 
opportunity is tempting. However, HFT cannot only be cost saving it also has to create profit.  
HFT is based on a complex set of algorithms that dictate what the computer is allowed to do. 
The algorithms are the rules, and the information it receives from the financial markets are 
the input. With all the data at hand the computer uses its vast capacity to find investment 
opportunities (Aldridge, 2010). “Trading software incorporates optimal execution algorithms 
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for achieving the best execution price within a given time interval through timing of trades, 
decisions on market aggressiveness, and sizing orders into optimal lots” (Aldridge, 2010).  
The computers do not use fundamental values to find investment opportunities. Instead, 
they follow the principles of EMH which claim that the information is reflected in the market 
price. With all the information available the computers look for irregularities in the market 
that may be profitable. Therefore the HFT computers will only need to look at the market 
values of the assets to pick up market wide or company specific changes. The information 
appears faster in the data then it does through the traditional news channels. Therefore the 
computer will have an informational advantage compared to human investors ("HFT," 2010). 
“At the heart of HFT is a simple idea that properly programmed computers are better traders 
than humans” (Aldridge, 2010). 
For HFT to be of any interest “two requirements must be met: the ability to quickly move in 
and out of positions and sufficient market volatility to ensure that changes in prices exceed 
transaction costs” (Aldridge, 2010). In Norway one such market is the OSE (equity market). It 
has the market liquidity that is needed, though it is a small market, and in April 2010 it 
upgraded its computer platform making it fast enough to benefit HFT.  
HFT software has different trading strategies but they all break down to exploiting small 
opportunities through informational advantage. “High-frequency trading opportunities 
range from microsecond price moves allowing a trader to benefit from market-making 
trades, to several minute-long strategies that trade on momentum forecasted by 
microstructure theories, to several-hour-long market moves” (Aldridge, 2010).  
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Data collection 
This thesis takes a closer look into the dynamic world of financial markets with a behavioral 
finance frame of mind. It is crucial to be able to differentiate between rational institutional 
investors and irrational private investors. It is assumed that investors that influence the 
markets through an investment bank consisting of financial advisors with the relevant 
education within finance (or similar) and working in an environment where they share and 
possess expertise knowledge of the financial markets are rational investors. On the other 
hand, it is assumed that investors that influence the financial markets directly through 
internet investment banks without consulting financial advisors are irrational investors. In 
this definition of irrational investors there may be individuals who are rational that are 
grouped in with the irrational investors; but hopefully there will only be a few. The rational 
investor will receive advice based on fundamental values, where as the irrational investors 
will trade on information found in the media. This information may have aspects of 
fundamental value, but it is very likely that they are opinion based views and therefore 
considered noise. The Norwegian equity markets can be accessed through traditional 
investment banking contacts, but also directly through internet (investment) banking. Most 
finance institutions offer services to both of these customer groups making it difficult to 
differentiate between rational and irrational investors in the publicly available cumulative 
data.   
3.1.1 Data for the first hypothesis 
There were attempts to obtain differentiated data from the investment banks themselves 
during the data collection part of this thesis. However, due to the secret nature of this 
industry, none were willing to disclose detailed information. As such, publicly available 
information from the OSE was used. In order to obtain an in-depth look at the difference 
between rational and irrational investors, two samples representing the two groups were 
created. Theoretically, a rational investor has been defined, among others, as a rational 
being with optimizing behavior and utility maximizing. This definition acts as a basis for the 
slightly more superficial definition used in this thesis.  As a sample for the rational investors, 
investment banks that do not offer internet banking are used. In this scenario, the customer 
must contact trained, rational, financial advisors before making an investment. In this 
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situation an investor cannot participate in the market without taking the advice of an expert. 
This makes them the rational sample. The second sample consists of the investment banks 
that only offer internet transactions. The customers of such investments banks do not have 
contact with any of the banks’ employees before making an investment. They may invest on 
hunches or news on the internet, but there is no guarantee that fundamental values are the 
basis for their investment. This makes them the irrational sample. There is a chance that 
rational investors are grouped into the irrational sample group. This can influence the 
analysis, but it is assumed that they would be in a minority and would not significantly 
influence the analysis. The sample groups are: 
x Rational investors: 
o SEB 
o Arctic 
o Carnegie 
 
x Irrational investors: 
o Skandiabanken 
o Nordnet 
o Netfunds 
This thesis looks upon the number of transactions performed by these banks to see if 
irrational investors can survive in the market place. Another choice could have been to look 
at turnover, but that would have made the analysis complicated due to the interconnection 
between turnover and the overall economy. Even though the economy changes, the number 
of transactions may not alter as much as the average size (turnover) of the transactions 
thereby giving a more accurate measure of the number of participants in the market. The 
two samples used account for roughly thirty percent of the transactions at the OSE 
(Appendix A): 
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Market share of Transactions (Average 2008-2012) 
Skandiabanken 1,61 SEB 8,51 
Nordnet 8,69 Artic 1,98 
Netfonds 3,6 Carnegie 2,4 
Total Irrational 13,90 Total Rational 12,89 
Table 1: The average market share (transactions) for the sample groups from 2008-2012 
thereby, hopefully giving a good representation of the market as a whole. One negative 
aspect of this data sample is the length of the sample period. The data is monthly (number 
of transactions per month), and goes back less than five years. Therefore, there will only be a 
small sample prior to the computer upgrade and an even smaller one afterwards. The 
sample may be too short to display the effects of HFT. Another problem may be that some 
or all of these rational investment banks may themselves use HFT and therefore not 
represent a sample of traditional rational investors. This thesis attempts to determine 
whether or not traditional investors would be influenced or unaffected by HFT, but they may 
have adopted the practice.  
3.1.2 Data for the second hypothesis 
To investigate the second research question, a sample to find the market volatility was 
needed. As there are almost 11 years of market data available, the daily adjusted value of 
OSE to calculate the historical market volatility was used. The historical volatility was 
determined by first calculating the continuous return in the adjusted (data corrected for 
dividends and splits) value of OSE through: 
Eq(34)    
1
ln t
t
V
V 
§ ·¨ ¸© ¹
 
Then the continuous return value (data over 30 days) to calculate the volatility over a thirty 
day period was used: 
Eq(35)    30( : )* 365t tSD V V   
In the formula above the volatility is scaled to annualized historical volatility by multiplying 
with the square root of 365. It does not have to be the number of days in the year. It could 
also have been scaled by number of trading days per year.  
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The historical volatility for visual inspection was utilized.  The data was acquired at 
yahoo.finance.com. The volatility was calculated over a thirty day period. The period from 
2008-today has been subject to an extremely volatile macro economy.   
In the analysis, some of the effects of the most extreme market movements have been 
controlled by introducing a variable of the VIX index. The VIX index is the volatility index of 
Chicago Board Options Exchange. It is considered a good measure of the market volatility, or 
market fear ("The CBOE volatility," 2009). Since the economical unrest is a global matter 
more than a regional Norwegian matter, the volatility that is captured in the VIX can be a 
good proxy for the unrest that influences the Norwegian markets. The data of the VIX index 
was acquired from yahoo finance. 
It is important to note that there is no guarantee that HFT was introduced directly after the 
computer upgrade. It is more likely that companies began developing and introducing the 
software over a time period after April 2010. This will make it more difficult to find clear 
results in either of my hypotheses, but we may be able to see the beginning of a trend. 
3.2 Testing 
 
3.2.1 Testing of hypothesis 1 
In hypothesis one, evidence that could prove or disprove whether irrational investors can 
survive in the financial markets is sought after. Number of transactions per month measures 
the activity/health of the institution. According to traditional finance theory an investor who 
trades on noise will lose their money to rational investors and cannot survive in the market 
place. Over time they will lose all their wealth and exit the market. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
x 0 :H  irrational investors can survive in the market place 
x 1 :H  irrational investors cannot survive in the market place 
I run a test with total amount of irrational transactions as a Y variable, and a dummy variable 
for the transactions performed after April 2010 in order to determine whether there has 
been a significant decline of irrational investors. Oxmetrics6 is the statistical program used 
where PcGive is chosen. Under categories, time series data is selected, and single equation 
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modeling using PcGive. The software then aids me in selecting a model by choosing 
automatic model selection. PcGive then runs several models picking the model that fits my 
data sample the best.  
Under the same hypothesis I investigate the effects of the upgrade on the rational sample. 
Rational investors trading on fundamental values will not change their investment 
philosophy despite the irrational investors being present or not. However, one can argue 
that the noise traders’ behavior influence how rational investors act since rational investors 
try to exploit the mispricing caused by the noise traders. My view is that the rational 
investors will base their investment decisions on the fundamental values of the assets 
regardless of whether noise traders are present or not.  Therefore, I would not expect a 
significant change in the number of transactions performed by the rational investors. 
However, it is important to note that the rational investors may have begun using HFT. My 
definition of rational investor emphasizes that it is investment banks that are rational. 
Internationally, it is these institutions that are using HFT. Therefore, it is not unlikely that 
some of the investment banks in the rational sample have engaged in the practice. If this is 
the case, an increase in the number of transactions performed by the rational sample may 
be seen. 
x 2 :H  rational investors are not affected by the upgrade 
x 3 :H  rational investors are affected by the upgrade 
On both of my tests I look for changes in the coefficients.  
The last test under hypothesis 1 looks at the total number of transactions in the market as 
endogenous variable (Y).  As explanatory variables I have total transactions for both 
irrational and rational and dummy variables (for transactions after April 2010) for both 
irrational and rational investors. This test is performed to understand the market rather than 
to test a hypothesis based on a theoretical framework. It is natural to assume that all parties 
involved (the rational and irrational samples) will have a positive impact on the total amount 
of transactions. In other words, an increase in the transaction amount for the irrational or 
rational will lead to an increase of the total number of transactions.  
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3.2.2 Testing of Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 attempts to determine whether or not the volatility of the OSE has changed 
after the computer upgrade in April 2010. “It is unlikely in the context of financial time series 
that the variance of the errors will be constant over time” (Brooks, 2008). It is more likely 
that the variance will be influenced by its preceding values. This is one of several features 
inherent in the volatility of financial markets that promotes a non linear model. The other 
elements are leptokurtosis (fat tail distributions in asset returns), volatility clustering 
(tendency for volatility to appear in groups), and leverage effects (tendency for volatility to 
increase more after negative shocks). Financial data needs a model that allows it to “follow 
different processes at different points in time” (Brooks, 2008).  
In Oxmetric6, one can test the null hypothesis that the variance of the errors is constant 
(homoscedastic) as they are in the classical linear models (Brooks, 2008). If we reject the null 
hypothesis and find that the variance is not constant (heteroscedastic) normal regression 
models will not suffice. This means that the volatility data is best described by a GARCH (1, 1) 
model. (GARCH stands for generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic.)  
In this test the hypothesis would be: 
x 5 :H  the market variance is not influenced by the computer upgrade 
x 6 :H  the market variance is influenced by the computer upgrade 
I used a dummy variable (volatility data after April 2010) to test for any effects that may 
have come from the computer upgrade. In an effort to control for the market volatility I have 
included a variable for the VIX index. The macroeconomic turbulence that has been moving 
through the financial markets since 2008 does not have its origin in Norway. Norway has 
only been affected because of the interconnected economies. Therefore, it is not unlikely to 
assume that the VIX index, which is considered to measure the volatility in the US market, 
can model the external volatility influencing the Norwegian financial markets. 
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4. Tests and models used  
There are a large variety of diagnostic tests and statistical models that can be used in this 
analysis. The next section provides a brief overview of the tests and model that I will be 
utilizing. The specification tests that I use look at aspects that are associated with time series 
analysis, and ordinary least squares analysis.  
4.1 ARCH – Heteroscedasticity 
The arch test looks for “ARCH effects” in the residuals. With ARCH effects I mean that the 
value of the error term is influenced by the squared value of the preceding error terms 
(Wooldridge, 2009). To test for ARCH effects one can run a normal regression:  
Eq(36)    1 2 2 3 3t t t ty x x uE E E     
 Save the residual ût, than square them and run a regression on q of its own lags: 
Eq(37)    
2 2 2 2
0 1 1 2 2 ...t t t q t qu u u uJ J J J        
The test statistic is defined as TR2. This is the number of observations multiplied with the 
statistic of the goodness of fit of the model for the previous regression (Brooks, 2008). The 
statistic has chi square distribution 2 ( )qF . The null hypotheses states that the gamma values 
(except 0J ) equals zero, which means that the variance of the error terms are constant. The 
alternative hypothesis states that at least one of the gamma values is not equal to zero, so 
the variance of the error terms is time varying.  
4.2 Normality test/ Asymptotic test 
The normality test assumes that the error term is independent of the explanatory variable. It 
tests to see if the data is well modeled by the normal distribution. The null hypothesis will 
state that the data has a normal distribution. The alternative hypothesis will state that the 
data does not have a normal distribution. Its difference is measured in the data’s kurtosis 
and skewness. The asymptotic test examines the same hypothesis, but with a slightly 
transformed test statistic (PcGive). OxMetrics reports the test statistic which is a 2F  
distribution.  
It is also possible to perform a visual analysis by plotting the data’s density function against 
the probability density function of the normal curve.  
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4.3 Autocorrelation (ACF - Correlogram) 
The autocorrelation function visually describes the correlation between values of a variable 
and its preceding values. This means that rt (correlation coefficient) is the correlation 
between variables xt and xt-1. The correlogram shows whether shocks introduced to the 
system will fade or if they will persist. If shocks persist in the data it is a non stationary 
process. This instability will make it difficult to estimate or forecast future values.  
4.4 GARCH (1, 1) 
The GARCH (1, 1) model is given by: 
Eq(38)    0t t ty Dupgrade VIX uE   J   
Eq(39)     
2(0, )t tu N V  
Eq(40)    
1
2 2 2
0 1 1 tt t t
u Dupgrade VIXV D D EV G     J  
This “model allows the conditional variance to be dependent upon” (Brooks, 2009) its 
previous lags. This means that the conditional variance is influenced by the error term of the 
previous period ( 21 1tuD  ), in addition to its own previous value ( 12tEV  ), and a long term 
average ( 0D ) (Brooks, 2009). Because of the non linear nature of the model it uses 
maximum likelihood estimation instead of ordinary least squares. Maximum likelihood will 
find the parameter values that optimize the equation. 
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5. Analyses 
 
5.1 Hypothesis one 
The first hypothesis investigates Freidman’s (1953) statement of the survival of noise 
traders. Friedman claimed that noise traders (irrational investors) would die out because 
they will buy when the prices are high, and sell when the prices are low. The rational 
investors will take advantage of their mispricing. If I were to estimate what would happen 
based on this theory, I would expect that the amount of irrational investors to decline after 
April 2010, but that the amount of rational investors stay the same or increase.  As the 
irrational investors are losing money they will soon run out of funds and motivation to 
invest. The rational investors will take advantage of the irrational investors, but they are not 
dependant on their survival. HFT is another form of rational investing, but I do not know if 
my sample group contains companies that actively pursue this form of trading. If they do not 
use HFT I would expect their level of transactions to remain, relatively, unchanged by the 
event of April 2010. If they use HFT, I would expect their level of transactions to increase 
significantly.  
Looking at the data we can see from figure 2 that the irrational investor group has had a 
declining market share since early 2009. This is before the computer upgrades that lead to 
HFT. It is therefore difficult to conclude anything specific from a visual analysis. The rational 
investors have had a stable market share all through the time series. Figure 2, on the next 
page, shows a declining market share for the irrational investors, but that does not mean 
that the total number of transactions is declining. If the total amount of transactions in the 
market increases drastically, the irrational investors may still have an increasing amount of 
transactions. 
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Figure 2: The samples share of the total amount of transactions (in percent) 
 
If we look at the actual number of transactions the image changes only slightly. 
 
 
Figure 3: The total amount of transactions of the two sample groups 
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Figure 3 shows the actual amount of transactions the two sample groups have performed 
between January 2008 and April 2012. The irrational sample clearly performed more 
transactions than the rational investors up to April 2010. From April 2010 till January 2011 it 
was a period of analogous transaction amounts, but from then on the rational investors have 
performed more transactions than the irrational. These graphs do not prove or disprove 
anything, but they give a visual confirmation of my expectations. To check whether the 
changes have been significant I must apply statistical measures. The null hypothesis states 
that there is no significant difference in the data after April 2010. The alternative hypothesis 
states that the data after April 2010 is significantly different than from before April 2010.  
Before selecting a model a closer look at the data sample is needed to outline its underlying 
characteristics.  
First I look at the autocorrelation functions to see if there are signs of autocorrelation. I look 
at the total sample and both sub sample to see if the sample groups display different 
tendencies then the market as a whole. This is done because classical finance theories claim 
that irrational investors behave in a different manner than rational investors. If this is true, 
this should be displayed in the characteristics of the data. 
  
 
Figure 4: Correlogram showing the ACF for the entire sample 
 
The total sample data (number of transactions at OSE) is clearly auto correlated. Figure 4 
shows a dying autocorrelation function. If a shock is introduced to the model it will 
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eventually die out. It is interesting that the data does not decline smoothly. The irregular 
occurrence of the”spikes” in the ACF speaks against seasonality. It may be caused by the 
volatile nature of the financial markets and the macro economy.   
 
 
Figure 5: Correlogram showing the ACF for the rational sample 
 
Figure 5 displays the ACF for the rational sample. The movement of the ACF for the rational 
sample is similar to the movements of the ACF of the total sample, showing clear 
autocorrelation. Figure 7 displays the ACF for the irrational sample group. This ACF is clearly 
different than the previous ones.  
 
Figure 6: Correlogram showing the ACF for the irrational sample 
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The ACF is declining, but has high peaks around periods 8, 9, and 12. After period 14 it 
becomes negative, and then increases in negativity. Due to a limited data sample it is unclear 
how the ACF behaves over a longer period of time. From the sample it is difficult to tell 
whether a shock would disappear or not. It is clear that the ACF for the irrational investors 
are different than the ones for the market and the rational investors. The rational and total 
sample clearly shows that shock will die out, where as the irrational ACF do not show clear 
signs of shocks dying out. This could mean that irrational investors have a harder time 
adapting to shocks. It is difficult to specify how their behavior changes. It seems that the 
effects of a shock lingers on, which could mean that they overreact and therefore prolong 
the shock themselves.  
Next I look at the probability density distribution of the sample data. In these graphs the 
actual sample is compared to a normal distribution curve. This can give a good illustration of 
whether the data is well modeled by a normal distribution. Classical linear regression 
assumes that the error terms are normally distributed. If the data shows clear signs of 
skewness or kurtosis it can create difficulties with the analysis (Wooldridge, 2009).  
 
 
 
Figure 7: The distribution of the total sample compared to the normal curve (skewness & kurtosis) 
 
Figure 7 show that the total sample has a positive skewness. This means that the distribution 
has a thicker tale on the right hand side. This demonstrates that there is a higher probability 
of achieving higher values in the real world then it is in a normal distribution.  
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Figure 8: The distribution of the rational sample compared to the normal curve (skewness & kurtosis) 
 
Figure 8 show that the rational sample has similar traits as the total sample. The only 
difference is a larger kurtosis.  
 
Figure 9: The distribution of the irrational sample compared to the normal curve (skewness & kurtosis) 
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Again, it is the irrational sample group that differs. The irrational investors have a density 
function that is very similar to the normal distribution. It is interesting to see the distinction 
of the irrational sample. This could mean that the irrational investors act in a more random 
manner than their rational counterparties. As the rational investors and the market as a 
whole have similar characteristics it is natural to assume that the market is predominately 
rational. 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix for the sample groups, and the whole population 
From table 2 it can be seen that there is high correlation between the rational sample and 
the total sample group. The irrational sample has a low correlation with both the total 
population and the rational sample group. The rational sample and the total population have 
an almost perfect correlation. In financial theory, it is assumed that the markets are rational. 
This data seems to support that notion. It is very interesting to see that the total irrational 
sample is almost unrelated to the rational sample. This could support the notion that noise 
traders act on information without any fundamental value. It may lead support to the notion 
that they act in a random manner.  
The data has several characteristics that make it difficult to choose an appropriate model. 
Oxmetrics automatic model selection was used to choose the model. 
  
36 
 
Modeling Total Irrational by OLS 
The estimation sample is: 1 - 51 
Coefficient  
 
Std.Error t-value t-prob 
Constant 462134 1,66E+04 27,80 0 
Total irrational/bin -0,191408 0,06477 -2,96 0,0048 
AR 1-2 test:      F(2,47)   = 3,7970 [0,0296]*   sigma 89006,7 
ARCH 1-1 test:    F(1,49)   3,7820 [0,0576] R^2 0,151285 
Normality test:   Chi^2(2) 0,77121 [0,6800] Adj,R^2 0,133965 
Hetero test:      F(2,48)  = 1,0177 [0,3691] no, of bservations 51 
Hetero-X test:    F(2,48) = 1,0177 [0,3691] mean(Y) 429628 
RESET23 test:     F(2,47)  14,236[0,0000]** RSS        3,8818771+011 
Hetero test:      F(2,48)  = 1,0177 [0,3691] F(1,49) =     8,734 [0,005] 
Hetero-X test:    F(2,48)    1,0177 [0,3691] log-likelihood -652,566 
RESET23 test:     F(2,47)  14,236[0,0000]** no, of parameters 2 
      se(Y) 95643,4 
Table 3: Test scores of irrational investors with dummy 
Table 3 shows the result of the regression of the irrational investors. I try to determine 
whether there has been a significant change in the behavior of the irrational investors after 
April 2010. The table reports the test scores of the variables and the results of several tests 
on the data. I will comment on the most important findings of these tests. The t-probability 
test score shows that both the constant and the dummy variable are significant. The dummy 
coefficient tells us that the irrational agents significantly reduced the number of transactions 
after April 2010. The test also shows that the data for the irrational sample is normally 
distributed. The normality test has a p-value of 0, 68 which means we will keep the null 
hypothesis of normal distribution. The ARCH test shows slight (not significant on a 5% level) 
heteroscedasticity but that is to be expected since the number of transactions is influenced 
by the economical and financial situation. 
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Modeling Total Rational by OLS 
       The estimation sample is: 1 - 51 
Coeff Std.Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2 
Constant 346541 1,34E+04 26 0 0,9322 
Totrat/bin 0,284927 0,04206 6,77 0 0,4836 
sigma 72047,1 RSS 2,54E+1 AR 1-2 test:   F(2,47) 5,5435[0,0069 
R^2 0,483598 F(1,49) = 45,89[0,0 ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,49) 0,625[0,4325 
Adj,R^2 0,473059 log-likelihood -641,785 Normality:Chi^2(2) 10,149[0,0063 
no, of obs 51 no, of paramet 2 
Hetero test:      
F(2,48) 
5,1714 
0,0092] 
mean(Y) 405771 se(Y) 99251,1 
Hetero-X test:    
F(2,48) 
5,1714 
0,0092] 
        
RESET23 test:     
F(2,47) 
28,778 
0,0000] 
Table 4: Test scores of rational investors with dummy 
Table 4 shows the test of the rational sample and the effects of a dummy variable for the 
transactions after April 2010. There is a significant change for the rational sample after the 
introduction of the computer upgrade. There is an increase in the number of transactions 
after the upgrade. The normality test shows that the data is not normally distributed. 
The last test that I performed under hypothesis one looks at the relationship between the 
sample groups and the total market. The total transactions are the endogenous variable. The 
total rational and total irrational plus their dummy variables are the explanatory variables.   
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Table 5: The analysis of the total market with the sample groups as explanatory variables 
From the analysis displayed above it is clear that neither the total irrational sample nor the 
total rational dummy is significant in explaining the total number of transactions. This would 
mean that these variables have moved in a random manner through their sample periods, 
and cannot explain the overall movements of the transaction markets.   
 
Table 6: The adjusted analysis of the total market with the sample groups as explanatory variables 
In the final analysis, displayed in table 6, OxMetrics has removed the rational dummy. The 
three remaining variables are significant in explaining the total number of transactions in the 
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market.  If the markets are rational it would be logical to assume that the samples of the 
rational investors are significant in explaining the market. Since the total sample of rational 
investors is significant, but the dummy variable is not, could mean that the rational investors 
have not been influenced by the introduction of HFT and have not changed their behavior 
dramatically after April 2010.   
This section will outline the conclusion of hypothesis 1. It is clear from the first analysis that 
the irrational investors have been significantly less active after the computer upgrade. This 
could mean that the introduction of HFT has a negative effect on the irrational investors. It is 
difficult to draw a definite conclusion because of the economical turbulence that is reflected 
in the data samples. However, if it was the macroeconomic conditions that caused the 
relationship it is curious that the rational investors significantly increased their activity level 
after the computer upgrade since it was expected that the rational investors would remain 
unaffected by it. The increase could be a consequence of the adoption of HFT by any of the 
three rational investors. It is difficult to confirm this because most companies do not 
proclaim their involvement with HFT. It is important to note that the two tests involving the 
rational dummy led to two different conclusions. This could mean that the data is borderline 
significant, which would make it difficult to draw conclusions.  With the limited time series 
data that I have available it seems that the irrational investors are being squeezed out of the 
financial markets. This is just an interpretation of the data up to this point, how it will evolve 
is another matter.   
5.2 Hypothesis two 
In the second hypothesis I attempt to discover whether irrational investors can survive in the 
market place. If irrational investors have an influence on the asset price they will increase 
the market volatility. If the introduction of more arbitrageurs (rational investors) through 
HFT reduces the market volatility it can be proof of the irrational investors influence. I run a 
test to see if there have been any significant changes to the volatility after the introduction 
of the new computer system in April 2010. The sample period has been very volatile, this 
should have (theoretically) reduced the willingness of rational investors to exploit the 
mispricing, and increased the irrational investors influence on the asset price.  
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The variable in this analysis is the volatility of the stock market. Volatility is known to be 
serially correlated (Brooks, 2008). Figure 10 shows the daily percentage change in total value 
of OSE. This figure displays periods of both high and low levels of change in the market.  
 
Figure 10: Daily percentage change in the value of OSE (2001-2012) 
Figure 11 shows a similar graph, but it displays the first difference of the actual volatility of 
the OSE.  As we can see from both of the graphs below, periods of high volatility tends to 
follow periods of high volatility, and periods of low levels of volatility also tends to follow 
each other.  
 
Figure 11: First difference of the volatility of OSE 
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Visual analysis shows that periods with large changes tend to group together. This is called 
volatility clustering and is common in financial data (Brooks, 2008). There are four-five 
periods of large and frequent changes in the sample. Both graphs can be seen as evidence 
that the data set is serially correlated.
 
Figure 12: VIX index distribution 
The control variable for the economical unrest in the market (VIX) displays a similar pattern 
as the OSE. There are five periods with high levels of unrest. This could mean that the 
incorporation of the VIX index may be able to control for the macroeconomic noise 
influencing OSE. 
 
Figure 13: Correlogram showing the Auto correlation function for the volatility 
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Figure 14: Correlogram showing the Auto correlation function for the residual of the adjusted closing price of OSE 
The auto correlation function (figure 13) shows that the volatility process will adjust to 
shocks very slowly. This means that the volatility data seems significantly auto correlated. In 
classical regression analysis, autocorrelation creates problems because it breaches an 
assumption for ordinary least squares regression. If auto correlation is present in the data it 
means that the error terms in the GARCH analysis will be correlated. The correlation in the 
error terms leads to an underestimating of the standard errors which leads to overestimated 
t-scores (Brooks, 2008).  Figure 14 shows the correlogram for the residuals of the adjusted 
closing price. This ACF shows that shocks introduced to the system will disappear, but it will 
take a long time for the effects of the shock to die out.   
Looking at the historical volatility data it is natural to expect that the density function of the 
historical volatility to be of a non normal form. Volatility tend to appear in clusters and be 
serially correlated which makes it natural with a non normal density distribution. Figure 15 
shows the density function of the historical volatility compared to the normal density 
function. 
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Figure 15: Shows the kurtosis and skewness of the volatility data’s probability distribution 
The kurtosis describes how the data’s probability distribution creates a peak, instead of the 
traditional bell shaped normal curve. Figure 15 shows a significant kurtosis in the data 
sample. This means that the residuals from the linear regression are not normally 
distributed. If they are not normally distributed there are certain tests that cannot be 
utilized on the data. It also shows significant positive skewness.  
Visual inspections are always prone to fault. A closer look at the descriptive statistics in 
Oxmetrics gave the following information: 
Observations 2700 
Mean 298.85 
Std.Devn. 119.30 
Skewness -0.0060737 
Excess Kurtosis -1.3235 
Minimum 98.570 
Maximum 524.37 
Asymptotic test:  Chi^2(2) 197.07 [0.0000] 
Normality test:   Chi^2(2) 372.65 [0.0000] 
ARCH 1-2 test:    F(2,2691) 18.470 [0.0000] 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for the OSE adjusted closing value 
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In the normality test and the asymptotic test the null hypothesis states that the data 
samples error terms are normally distributed, where as the alternative hypothesis states 
that the data samples error terms are not normally distributed. From this analysis we can 
clearly see in the asymptotic test (p-value = 0), and the normality test (p-value = 0) that the 
data does not possess normally distributed error terms. The ARCH test is a test for 
autocorrelation. The test shows that the error terms has a non linear pattern (p-value = 0). A 
non linear pattern means that the values of the error terms are influenced by its preceding 
values. 
The characteristics that the data displays are normal when dealing with financial time series. 
To analyze my data further I use a model that can handle the non linear character inherent 
in the data.  One such model is the GARCH (1, 1).  
The GARCH analysis examines whether the volatility of OSE has changed significantly after 
April 2010. The test yielded the following results: 
 
Table 8: Modeling volatility with a GARCH (1, 1) model 
Table 8 displays the results from the GARCH analysis investigating the volatility of OSE. Alpha 
0 is a constant. The variable Bin price is the dummy variable for the adjusted price level to 
see if the prices have significantly changed after April 2010. The VIX variable is the control 
variable that will control for the macroeconomic noise that has been significant in the 
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sample period. Alpha 1 is the coefficient for the first order autocorrelation, and beta is the 
coefficient of the first order auto regression. The table also shows other statistics relating to 
descriptive statistics and model fit.  The analysis shows that the adjusted prices are not 
significantly different after the computer upgrade. The control variable for the macro 
economy is significant (p-value = 0) in describing the price movements. It is surprising that 
the volatility is not significantly dependant on its lagged values (p=0,089). With volatility 
clustering present in the data I would have expected this parameter to be significant. The 
effect of the lagged shock is significant. It is surprising that the lagged values of the volatility 
is not significant, but that could be an effect of the unique macroeconomic situation. Since 
2008 the economy has been thrown back and forth from constant economical shocks. These 
frequent and significant shocks may have caused such movements in the volatility that the 
previous values became less important predictors. This could mean that the volatility over 
this period has been shock driven (mainly influenced by u). The financial markets have been 
extremely volatile in the sample period. This makes it impossible to determine whether the 
relationship is a normal phenomenon or caused by the extreme conditions. 
If I assume that there is nothing wrong with the data or the analysis it would mean that the 
introduction of HFT has had no effect on the volatility of the stock market. There are certain 
difficulties associated with the data sample. The biggest problem is the amount of 
macroeconomic noise that has influenced the markets since 2008. There have been periods 
of extreme volatility. I believe I have been able to remove most of the influence of these 
factors from my analysis by adding the VIX as a control variable, but this period of time has 
been unique so the results may have been different with longer data samples.  
Another issue is that I have assumed that HFT robots act rationally. In the sample period, 
there is evidence of at least one trading robot acting irrationally in a case where two 
investors were charged with market manipulation. The robot observed movements in stocks 
with low liquidity and treated it as a stock where the investor interest increased 
dramatically. The investors triggered the robots interest and then reversed their position for 
a profit. In this instance, the computer was taken advantage of because of its simple trading 
behavior (Steinsland and Dahl, 2012). If enough robots act in an irrational manner it can 
remove the foundation that this thesis is built upon.  
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6. Conclusion 
It is not easy to distinguish between irrational and rational investors in aggregated data. In 
my first hypothesis I looked into Friedman’s (1953) claim of the survival of irrational 
investors. The analysis shows that the numbers of transactions performed by the irrational 
investors were significantly reduced after April 2010. This is not evidence proving that the 
irrational investors will die out. It only demonstrates that the irrational investors have been 
less active. It is therefore acceptable to conclude that the introduction of HFT has had a 
negative effect on irrational investors which could lead to their extinction (if the trend 
continues).  
The second hypothesis investigated the power of irrational investors’ influence on asset 
prices. The analysis showed that the volatility of OSE had not changed significantly after April 
2010 when controlled for the macroeconomic volatility. This supports the notion that 
irrational investors do not have an influence on the asset price. Aspects of the sample data 
from hypothesis 1 illustrated that the irrational sample was well modeled by the normal 
distribution. These results could support the idea of random behavior among irrational 
investors therein nullifying their own price effect.  
It is interesting to see from the data under hypothesis 1 that the irrational sample clearly 
showed different characteristics than the rational sample and the market data. This could be 
seen as evidence for a rational market and that the irrational investors act in a random 
manner. It would be interesting to perform deeper enquiries in these topics.  However, 
detailed information would need to be obtained from the investment banks on their rational 
and irrational investors. At the moment there is too much information that is withheld to 
fully understand the relationship between irrational and rational investors. 
To conclude H0 is rejected, and H1 is accepted. Irrational investors cannot survive in the 
financial markets. H2 is rejected, and H3 is accepted. Rational investors had an increase in 
activity after April 2010 which could be explained by their adoption of HFT.  H5 is accepted. 
The market volatility is unaffected by the introduction of HFT proving that irrational 
investors do not have an influence on asset prices.   
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8. Appendix A 
 
Dataset used in hypothesis 1, acquired from OSE.no. 
 
Transaction (Market share) 
Skandiabanken Nordnet Netfonds Total irrational SEB Artic Carnegie 
Totalt 
rational 
Total 
sample size 
jan.08 1,61 9,46 4,95 16,01 7,65 1,63 3,35 12,64 28,65 
feb.08 1,74 10,11 5,23 17,08 7,43 1,88 3,48 12,79 29,87 
mar.08 1,86 9,98 5,06 16,89 7,54 1,65 3,09 12,28 29,17 
apr.08 1,57 9,66 4,79 16,03 7,27 1,89 3,19 12,36 28,39 
mai.08 1,72 9,51 4,37 15,60 8,17 1,83 2,59 12,59 28,19 
jun.08 1,16 8,80 3,61 13,57 8,38 2,08 2,45 12,91 26,47 
jul.08 1,07 7,40 3,37 11,83 9,16 1,74 2,26 13,16 24,99 
aug.08 1,12 8,46 3,71 13,29 8,93 2,29 2,19 13,41 26,69 
sep.08 1,27 9,35 3,56 14,18 9,19 1,87 1,88 12,95 27,13 
okt.08 1,98 10,81 4,42 17,21 10,29 1,95 1,97 14,21 31,42 
nov.08 2,30 13,36 5,24 20,90 9,51 1,81 1,49 12,81 33,71 
des.08 2,36 12,96 5,15 20,47 8,83 2,18 1,55 12,56 33,03 
jan.09 2,26 13,01 5,44 20,71 8,68 2,44 1,75 12,87 33,57 
feb.09 2,14 12,64 4,89 19,68 9,01 2,06 1,81 12,89 32,57 
mar.09 1,99 12,72 4,80 19,52 9,08 2,16 1,58 12,83 32,35 
apr.09 2,12 12,23 4,81 19,16 8,67 2,22 2,55 13,45 32,61 
mai.09 2,33 12,95 5,01 20,28 8,14 2,12 2,27 12,53 32,81 
jun.09 2,08 12,74 4,74 19,56 8,58 1,99 2,34 12,90 32,46 
jul.09 1,91 9,94 3,92 15,78 11,20 1,94 2,12 15,26 31,03 
aug.09 1,85 11,21 4,17 17,24 10,30 2,25 2,49 15,04 32,28 
sep.09 1,83 11,66 3,97 17,46 8,45 2,58 2,56 13,59 31,05 
okt.09 1,88 11,02 4,03 16,92 8,55 2,45 2,48 13,48 30,40 
nov.09 1,94 11,97 4,39 18,29 7,83 2,18 2,00 12,01 30,30 
des.09 1,86 10,96 4,31 17,12 8,28 2,21 1,98 12,47 29,60 
jan.10 1,89 11,44 4,21 17,54 7,57 2,39 2,41 12,37 29,91 
feb.10 1,58 10,91 3,59 16,08 7,96 2,31 2,02 12,30 28,37 
mar.10 1,94 10,50 3,82 16,27 8,51 2,13 2,60 13,24 29,51 
apr.10 1,85 8,97 3,39 14,21 7,46 2,08 2,43 11,97 26,17 
mai.10 1,51 8,46 3,00 12,97 8,26 1,68 1,92 11,85 24,82 
jun.10 1,42 8,09 2,89 12,40 8,08 1,79 2,34 12,20 24,60 
jul.10 1,37 6,90 2,64 10,90 8,22 1,13 1,87 11,22 22,12 
aug.10 1,48 8,13 3,15 12,76 8,14 2,23 1,88 12,26 25,02 
sep.10 1,53 8,19 3,17 12,89 7,69 2,11 2,30 12,09 24,98 
okt.10 1,52 7,70 2,94 12,15 7,25 1,97 2,14 11,36 23,52 
nov.10 1,93 7,89 3,19 13,00 7,10 2,06 2,41 11,58 24,58 
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des.10 2,03 7,72 3,35 13,10 7,92 1,74 3,36 13,01 26,11 
jan.11 1,82 7,02 2,97 11,81 7,60 2,13 3,23 12,96 24,77 
feb.11 1,81 6,46 2,84 11,11 7,80 1,62 2,98 12,39 23,50 
mar.11 1,40 5,75 2,52 9,67 7,67 1,30 2,76 11,72 21,39 
apr.11 1,27 5,36 2,51 9,14 8,64 1,84 2,96 13,44 22,58 
mai.11 1,22 5,37 2,40 8,98 9,97 1,74 2,92 14,62 23,60 
jun.11 1,07 4,98 2,10 8,14 10,33 1,05 2,45 13,84 21,98 
jul.11 1,17 4,92 2,08 8,17 10,40 1,30 2,47 14,17 22,35 
aug.11 1,33 5,24 2,53 9,09 10,44 1,31 2,29 14,05 23,14 
sep.11 1,05 5,20 2,37 8,61 9,95 1,50 2,18 13,64 22,25 
okt.11 1,26 5,46 2,72 9,44 9,35 1,58 2,70 13,63 23,07 
nov.11 1,17 5,40 2,45 9,02 8,26 1,56 2,90 12,73 21,75 
des.11 1,33 5,05 2,74 9,11 7,58 1,55 1,85 10,98 20,10 
jan.12 1,38 5,25 2,95 9,58 7,00 1,69 1,96 10,66 20,23 
feb.12 0,98 4,50 2,59 8,07 8,10 3,61 2,41 14,12 22,19 
mar.12 0,80 4,56 2,31 7,67 7,77 3,22 2,67 13,66 21,33 
apr.12 0,72 3,79 1,91 6,42 8,17 3,03 2,71 13,90 20,32 
Average 1,61 8,69 3,60 13,91 8,51 1,98 2,40 12,88 26,79 
 
 
Total number of transactions 
Skandia-
banken Nordnet Netfonds 
Total 
Irrational SEB Artic Carnegie 
Total 
Rational Totalt 
01.01.2008 54977 323424 169306 547707 261779 55703 114663 432145 3420128 
01.02.2008 45851 267008 138159 451018 196195 49629 91874 337698 2640068 
01.03.2008 37614 202334 102573 342521 152842 33516 62561 248919 2027454 
01.04.2008 40776 250936 124465 416177 188877 49076 82893 320846 2596456 
01.05.2008 44388 245289 112801 402478 210764 47181 66852 324797 2580320 
01.06.2008 28134 213831 87744 329709 203710 50498 59439 313647 2430182 
01.07.2008 28104 194926 88726 311756 241501 45945 59482 346928 2635336 
01.08.2008 25966 196896 86194 309056 207670 53180 51027 311877 2326288 
01.09.2008 46099 338079 128810 512988 332502 67792 68152 468446 3617330 
01.10.2008 80757 441222 180433 702412 419960 79411 80413 579784 4080656 
01.11.2008 69730 404865 158619 633214 287954 54921 45190 388065 3029418 
01.12.2008 54784 300190 119254 474228 204608 50471 35960 291039 2316652 
01.01.2009 60005 345428 144322 549755 230334 64786 46548 341668 2655038 
01.02.2009 50437 297331 115027 462795 212007 48545 42676 303228 2352040 
01.03.2009 49346 315060 118774 483180 224881 53551 39243 317675 2475938 
01.04.2009 47409 272892 107273 427574 193587 49650 56846 300083 2231724 
01.05.2009 67548 376033 145354 588935 236225 61571 66048 363844 2903688 
01.06.2009 55627 341553 127049 524229 229843 53268 62778 345889 2680314 
01.07.2009 45198 234711 92637 372546 264486 45773 49953 360212 2361152 
01.08.2009 47035 285119 106087 438241 261989 57139 63356 382484 2542692 
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01.09.2009 52887 337136 114906 504929 244416 74550 74076 393042 2891904 
01.10.2009 59513 349602 127805 536920 271401 77661 78612 427674 3173402 
01.11.2009 54624 337718 123760 516102 220964 61612 56342 338918 2821546 
01.12.2009 44617 263191 103596 411404 198917 53150 47573 299640 2402442 
01.01.2010 61230 370331 136203 567764 245113 77447 77932 400492 3237370 
01.02.2010 49485 342532 112562 504579 249947 72566 63396 385909 3138698 
01.03.2010 57278 309254 112622 479154 250508 62876 76613 389997 2945076 
01.04.2010 58324 283005 107034 448363 235388 65524 76691 377603 3155794 
01.05.2010 55636 311212 110270 477118 303739 61682 70687 436108 3678908 
01.06.2010 50820 288951 103381 443152 288599 64068 83508 436175 3573882 
01.07.2010 42976 216843 82934 342753 258559 35387 58789 352735 3143806 
01.08.2010 43971 242320 93934 380225 242595 66569 56167 365331 2979824 
01.09.2010 45435 242623 93795 381853 227748 62391 68135 358274 2962702 
01.10.2010 47416 240598 91886 379900 226597 61686 66878 355161 3125922 
01.11.2010 66872 273980 110852 451704 246676 71722 83804 402202 3473608 
01.12.2010 56409 214116 93070 363595 219710 48236 93111 361057 2775240 
01.01.2011 64976 250277 106035 421288 270946 76095 115313 462354 3566860 
01.02.2011 63273 225982 99240 388495 272602 56483 104012 433097 3495988 
01.03.2011 53019 217940 95593 366552 290870 49206 104548 444624 3792216 
01.04.2011 33758 142300 66516 242574 229294 48940 78579 356813 2654650 
01.05.2011 42787 188068 83971 314826 349314 60886 102345 512545 3505172 
01.06.2011 35039 163533 68930 267502 339308 34594 80620 454522 3284260 
01.07.2011 36730 154057 64973 255760 325286 40813 77380 443479 3128618 
01.08.2011 73237 288578 139217 501032 575044 72416 126334 773794 5508920 
01.09.2011 46967 233296 106146 386409 446627 67467 97917 612011 4487308 
01.10.2011 54444 235507 117437 407388 403674 68057 116653 588384 4316530 
01.11.2011 53457 245988 111388 410833 376392 71208 132107 579707 4555214 
01.12.2011 43703 166546 90278 300527 249897 51198 61112 362207 3297630 
01.01.2012 55292 209571 117846 382709 279802 67676 78187 425665 3994950 
01.02.2012 62673 243271 119099 425043 386437 93961 103880 584278 4670294 
01.03.2012 53061 213907 103068 370036 328693 75288 97282 501263 4283174 
 
 
 
